Suchergebnisse

Why did President Bill Clinton, while having linked human rights to China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) status in 1993, delink the two issues in 1994, despite the fact that China had not improved its human rights record? This article explains Clinton's linkage-delinkage policy reversal in terms of 'strategic co-constitution'. After Tiananmen, Washington was concerned about China's human rights abuses, arms proliferation and unfair trade practices. During 1992−3, Clinton initiated a 'strategic social construction' process that translated human rights into the linkage policy. Clinton stressed that a humane, democratic China would neither proliferate weapons nor engage in unfair trade practices. In 1994, however, a pro-MFN coalition persuaded Clinton that open trade could better advance US security, economic and human rights interests in China. Framing their rhetoric in ways that resonated with the exiting US concerns over China, pro-MFN actors led a strategic social construction process that redefined Clinton's China policy toward engagement.

According to resource curse theory, oil may cause ethnic rebellions. However, this article proposes a conditional explanation for the oil-causes-rebellions curse by examining indigenous movements in oil-producing countries in Latin America. I argue that oil price drops and oil-caused land conflicts increase the likelihood of rebellions if indigenous peoples remain under-urbanized, as evidenced by the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Mexico. Conversely, indigenous peoples are likely to pursue an ethnic politics that is 'pacted' if oil-led economic activities have urbanized them. In Venezuela and Ecuador, oil has created an urban-indigenous class. When Venezuela and Ecuador introduced neoliberal reforms to deal with their economic crises caused by oil price drops, indigenous peoples made efforts to codify indigenous rights in the constitution as a pact. I conclude that this conditional explanation fits Latin America due to two regional factors: ethno-corporatist legacies and diffusion effects.

AbstractThis article explains how Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration was able to restrict cross-Strait fruit trade and resist China's "fruit offensive" in a democratic setting. During 2004–2005, China implemented various preferential policies for the importation of Taiwanese fruit and wooed Taiwanese farmers in the rural south, where political support for the DPP was concentrated. However, trade statistics show that cross-Strait fruit trade only increased slightly, making up just 4 or 5 per cent of Taiwan's total fruit exports during 2005–2008. I argue that focusing solely on regime type ignores the formal and informal policy instruments a democratic state can wield to manage its commercial ties with, and resist economic offensives from, other states. Cross-Strait fruit trade was limited because the DPP used legal as well as corporatist informal policy instruments to resist China's fruit offensive. I conclude that state–society institutional relations explain cross-Strait economic relations and economic statecraft better than regime type alone.

This article explains how Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration was able to restrict cross-Strait fruit trade and resist China's "fruit offensive" in a democratic setting. During 2004-2005, China implemented various preferential policies for the importation of Taiwanese fruit and wooed Taiwanese farmers in the rural south, where political support for the DPP was concentrated. However, trade statistics show that cross-Strait fruit trade only increased slightly, making up just 4 or 5 per cent of Taiwan's total fruit exports during 2005-2008. I argue that focusing solely on regime type ignores the formal and informal policy instruments a democratic state can wield to manage its commercial ties with, and resist economic offensives from, other states. Cross-Strait fruit trade was limited because the DPP used legal as well as corporatist informal policy instruments to resist China's fruit offensive. I conclude that state-society institutional relations explain cross-Strait economic relations and economic statecraft better than regime type alone. (China Q/GIGA)